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Staible et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
THE 34TH ORDINARY SESSION of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Commission) took place in Banjul,
the Gambia, on November 6 – 20, 2003.
Opened by the Vice-President of the Gambia,
Isatou Njie Saidy, the delegates of the states
parties were urged to ratify the Protocol
Establishing an African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Court), which was first introduced in 1998, and the Protocol Relating to
the Rights of Women. The protocol establishing the Court outlines details such as the
Court’s jurisdiction and its ability to offer
advisory opinions. The protocol relating to
the rights of women supplements the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Charter) and guarantees significant rights for
women, such as the right to equal representation in the judiciary. In addition, the protocol
calls for the legal prohibition of female genital mutilation. State and non-state participants in the session reiterated the urgency of
ratifying the protocols and demanded that the
Commission take further action to speed the
entry of the protocols into force.
In a separate resolution, the Commission
adopted the report of the fact-finding mission
to Zimbabwe, which had previously been
ignored. According to the Zimbabwe
Independent, the report was alleged to have
detailed human rights abuses and condemned
the government of President Robert Mugabe
for perpetrating the abuses. The report has not
yet been published for the public.

AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
While the 34th Ordinary Session of the
Commission failed to establish the Court, the
Union of Comoros became the 15th African
state to ratify the Protocol for the
Establishment of the Court on December 30,
2003. The protocol came into force within
thirty days of the deposit of the 15th instrument of ratification, which occurred on

January 25, 2004. The Secretary-General of
the African Union (AU) must now request
each state party to present a list of candidates
for judges within ninety days and the lists must
be presented thirty days prior to the next AU
Assembly, which will occur in July this year.
After receiving the instrument, Professor Alpha
Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the AU,
appealed to other African states to expedite
signing or ratifying the protocol. Thirty-nine
states have thus far signed, but have not yet ratified the protocol, which was introduced in
1998, while eleven states have not signed the
protocol at all.
The protocol grants the Court broad
jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, the protocol and any other
African
human
rights
convention.
Additionally, the Court is granted the right to
provide advisory opinions to the AU or any of
its organs. The protocol initially entitled only
the Commission or states parties to submit
cases, but later provided that on exceptional
grounds, individuals, non-governmental
organizations, and groups of individuals may
submit cases to the Court.
International organizations have noted the
importance of the Court in the overall development of human rights in Africa. Amnesty
International states, for example, that “[t]he
establishment of an independent and effective
African Court enabled to render decisions that
are binding represents an important development and will make a vital contribution to the
efforts to strengthen the African regional
human rights system, and stimulate positive
change throughout Africa.”

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
THE EUROPEAN COURT of Human Rights
(ECHR) was established in 1959 under the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention). Enforcing the obligations entered into by the Council of
Europe’s contracting states, the court is com27

posed of the number of judges equal to that of
the contracting states. Any contracting state or
individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention may lodge a complaint
with the court. In its decisions, the court takes
into account the various legal systems of the
contracting states.

M.C. V. BULGARIA
The recent judgment of the ECHR in
M.C. v. Bulgaria paved the way for greater
protection of European victims of sexual violence. This case, brought by a young female
rape victim, rejected the notion that force
must be established in cases of sexual violence. The ECHR’s decision to compel
Bulgaria to pay damages to M.C. will likely
serve as a guide to reform the treatment of
rape cases under Bulgarian law.
In her complaint before the ECHR, M.C.
alleged that she was raped by two male
acquaintances when she was fourteen years
old. The incident surrounding M.C.’s complaint took place in July 1995, when M.C.
went to a disco with an acquaintance and two
unfamiliar men. Later, she continued on to
another disco with a group, including the
two men. On their return trip, the men
decided to stop and swim in a reservoir,
despite M.C.’s objections. M.C. remained in
the car, but claimed that when one of the
men returned, he forced her to have sex with
him and that she was unable to push him
away. The next morning, M.C. was at a private home when she alleged that the second
of the two men raped her. Again, she was
unable to resist his strength. She maintained
that she cried throughout this incident and
following the rape. Later, her mother took
her to the hospital, where a medical examination revealed bruises on her neck and evidence of sexual activity.
Bulgarian authorities then conducted an
investigation into the alleged rapes. Under
Bulgarian law, threats or the use of force are
necessary elements of rape. Following his
inquiry into the incident, the district prosecutor concluded that neither threats nor the use
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of force were established beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, he concluded that the men did
not force M.C. to have sexual intercourse with
them, and he terminated the proceedings in
March 1997.
M.C. filed a petition with the ECHR in
December 1997, and it was declared admissible in December 2002. She argued that her
country’s laws failed to ensure protection
against rape and sexual abuse because Bulgaria
prosecuted only those cases in which the victim actively resisted the conduct in question.
Further, M.C. argued that under the European
Convention, Bulgaria has a positive obligation
to protect an individual’s physical integrity and
private life, as well as to provide an effective
remedy for breaches of those rights. In her
complaint, M.C. relied on article 3 of the
European Convention, prohibiting degrading
treatment; article 8, upholding the right to
respect for private life; article 13, guaranteeing
the right to an effective remedy; and article 14,
prohibiting discrimination.
In its judgment of December 4, 2003, the
ECHR unanimously found violations of articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention. The
court maintained that under these articles,
state parties to the European Convention have
positive obligations to enact criminal legislation to effectively punish rape and sexual violence, and to apply such legislation over the
course of the investigation and prosecution of
sexual crimes.
The court observed that in most European
and other common law jurisdictions, all references to physical force were removed from rape
legislation and case law. Although most
European countries are influenced by the continental legal standards, according to which the
definition of rape contains references to violence
or threats of violence by the perpetrator, the constituent element of rape in the case law of these
countries is lack of consent. The court also highlighted the obligations of states parties under
article 1 to secure the rights and freedoms
defined in the European Convention. Read with
article 3, article 1 requires states to take measures
designed to protect individuals from ill-treatment, including such treatment at the hands of
private individuals. Under article 8, states are
obligated to protect the right to respect for private life. While measures to secure compliance
under article 8 fall within a state’s margin of

appreciation, efficient criminal law provisions
are necessary to deter serious acts such as rape.
Article 3 has also been interpreted by the
court to create a positive obligation to conduct
official investigations. Such an obligation is
not limited to cases of ill-treatment by state
agents. The jurisprudence of the court has not
foreclosed the possibility that a state’s positive
obligation under article 8 may extend to the
effectiveness of a criminal investigation. Thus,
the court concluded that states have obligations under articles 3 and 8 to enact provisions
and to effectively punish rape through investigation and prosecution.
The court further stated that member
states of the Council of Europe have agreed
that punishing non-consensual sexual acts,
notwithstanding resistance by the victim, is
necessary to effectively protect women against
violence. Moreover, the court relied on the
determination of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that in
international criminal law, sexual penetration
without the victim’s consent constitutes rape.
This suggests a universal trend of viewing lack
of consent as the essential element of rape and
sexual abuse. Thus, member states’ positive
obligations under articles 3 and 8 of the
European Convention necessitate the punishment and prosecution of any non-consensual
sexual act without regard to the presence or
absence of physical resistance by the victim.
The court also found that the methods
used by the Bulgarian investigator and prosecutor were insufficient to fulfill Bulgaria’s positive obligations under articles 3 and 8 of the
European Convention. The court held that
Bulgarian authorities should have examined all
the facts of M.C.’s case, and that they should
have based their decision on an analysis of all
the surrounding circumstances. Notably, the
court stated that the Bulgarian authorities
should have focused on the issue of non-consent of the victim. In the view of the court,
Bulgaria’s positive obligations under articles 3
and 8 are elucidated by modern standards in
international law. Specifically, states must
establish effective criminal law systems that
punish all forms of rape and sexual abuse.
The ECHR deemed further analysis under
articles 13 or 14 of the European Convention
unnecessary. The court awarded M.C. 8,000
28

euros for non-pecuniary damages and 4,110
euros for her expenses.

LOIZIDOU V. TURKEY
On December 2, 2003, the Netherlands
Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe announced that
Turkey executed the judgment issued in the
July 1998 case of Loizidou v. Turkey by paying
Ms. Loizidou the sum that she was awarded as
just satisfaction under article 50 of the
European Convention. In this case, the ECHR
held that Turkey had deprived Titina Loizidou,
a Greek Cypriot, of access to and enjoyment of
her property in northern Cyprus.
Ms. Loizidou owned several plots of land in
Kyrenia, northern Cyprus. Cyprus was violently split between Turkey and Greece in 1974,
when Turkey invaded northern Cyprus and
began its occupation. Ms. Loizidou lost her
property following the Turkish invasion, even
though she had already begun construction of a
home on one of her plots of land. She and her
family fled to the south of Cyprus in 1974.
In 1989, Ms. Loizidou lodged a complaint
before the ECHR. Seven years later, in 1996,
the ECHR ruled for Ms. Loizidou, holding that
the continuous denial of access to her property
in northern Cyprus and the resulting loss of all
control over it was a matter within Turkey’s
“jurisdiction.” Under article 1 of the European
Convention, Turkey, a contracting party, has the
obligation to secure rights and freedoms to
everyone in its jurisdiction. Thus, Turkey could
be held accountable for Ms. Loizidou’s loss. The
court also found a breach of article 1 of Protocol
1 of the Convention governing peaceful enjoyment of possessions where, in effect, Ms.
Loizidou had lost both control over her property and the possibility to enjoy it. The court dismissed Turkey’s objections, arguing that the
interference with Ms. Loizidou’s property was
not imputable to Turkey and that the court
could not proceed with the case until there was
political agreement on the situation in Cyprus.
On July 28, 1998, a Grand Chamber of
the ECHR ordered Turkey to pay Ms.
Loizidou damages pursuant to the 1996 judgment. According to the court, Turkey was to
pay Ms. Loizidou pecuniary damages, nonpecuniary damages, and costs and expenses
within three months.
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The execution of the judgment in the
Loizidou case is significant not only because of
the human rights issue, but also because of the
precedent Turkey’s compliance with the ruling
of the ECHR establishes. Ms. Loizidou is the
first individual to receive a payment of damages from Turkey. It is estimated that there are
several hundred similar applications lodged by
Greek Cypriots before the ECHR. Although
Ms. Loizidou still does not have access to or
use of her property, the Chair of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe stated that “the conclusion of the
Loizidou case, which is the result of efforts by
all member states, demonstrates the effectiveness of the right of individual appeal available
to 800 million Europeans before the
Strasbourg Court.”

INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM
IN RESPONSE TO A PETITION by Mexico, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Inter-American Court or Court) issued
Advisory Opinion 18 on the rights of undocumented migrant workers in September 2003.
The advisory opinion stated that undocumented migrant workers have the same fundamental human rights of equal protection before the
law and non-discrimination as legal workers
and that they should have the opportunity to
exercise those rights regardless of their immigration status.
In November 2003, the Court found that
Guatemala was responsible for the planning,
execution, and cover-up of Myrna Mack
Chang’s 1990 murder. It held that Guatemala
had violated article 4 (right to life), article 5
(right to personal integrity), article 8 (right to
a fair trial), and article 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention or
Convention). The Court ordered a creative
reparations schema and gave the Guatemalan
government one year to comply.

ADVISORY OPINION 18
On September 17, 2003, the InterAmerican Court issued Advisory Opinion 18
on the rights of undocumented migrant workers in the region. Mexico, with approximately
2,490,000 undocumented migrant workers

abroad, petitioned the Court to address the
legal rights of these individuals. Several other
member states submitted written comments to
the Court, including Honduras, Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Paraguay, the
Dominican Republic, Brazil, Panama,
Argentina, and Peru. Regional and international bodies, such as the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (InterAmerican Commission or Commission) and
the United Nations, presented comments as
well. In addition, universities, NGOs, and law
firms throughout the region submitted amicus
curiae briefs to the Court.
Mexico’s Petition
In its May 2002 petition, Mexico voiced
concern that member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) were discriminating against undocumented migrant workers
in their enforcement of fundamental labor
rights. Mexico alleged that this disparity violated the principles of equal protection before the
law and non-discrimination. Mexico identified
fundamental labor rights as the right to equal
pay for equal work, the right to reasonable and
satisfactory payment (including social security
benefits and back pay), the right to establish or
join a labor union, the right to judicial and
administrative guarantees to determine one’s
rights, and the prohibition against forced and
child labor. While Mexico recognized the right
of member states to withhold certain political
rights and social benefits based on immigration
status, it maintained that such disparate treatment could not violate international human
rights principles.
In submitting this issue for the Court’s
consideration, Mexico cited relevant international human rights instruments such as the
OAS Charter, which requires that member
states respect international law (article 3(1)),
the rights of individuals, and the principles of
universal morality (article 17); the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,
which guarantees all persons equal protection
before the law (article 2); the American
Convention, which guarantees domestic legal
effects (article 2) and equal protection before
the law (article 24) and requires member states
to respect and ensure the exercise of all rights
contained in the Convention without
discrimination (article 1(1)); the Universal
29

Declaration of Human Rights, which requires
universal equality in dignity and rights (article
1), equal protection (article 7), and entitlement to the rights included in the Declaration
(article 2(1)); and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which applies to
all people within the territory of a state party
(article 2(1)), requires state parties to give
effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant
(article 2(2)), does not permit derogation from
fundamental human rights based on the pretext that the Covenant does not recognize
them (article 5(2)), and guarantees the right to
equal protection (article 26).
Mexico alleged that, within the proposed
legal framework, the national immigration
policies of certain member states lie in direct
contravention to international human rights
norms in that they violate the universally recognized principles of equal protection and
non-discrimination.
The Court’s Opinion
The Court held that the immigration status of an individual cannot serve as justification for the deprivation of that individual’s
human rights, including fundamental labor
rights. Member states have the obligation to
respect and guarantee the rights of all workers,
regardless of their immigration status, such as
the right to equal and satisfactory pay for equal
work and the right to organize and collectively
bargain. The Court emphasized that undocumented migrant workers have the same fundamental human rights as all other workers and
therefore they should have the ability to exercise and realize such rights in practice. Finally,
the Court found that no member state shall
condition their adherence to the principles of
equality before the law and non-discrimination
on domestic public policy objectives, including
their immigration policy.
Analysis
While Advisory Opinion 18 never explicitly names the United States, the Court’s
words seem to be directed almost exclusively
at the United States and its national immigration policy. In January 2002, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board (Hoffman) that an undocumented
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worker, fired for union activity, was not entitled to back pay because he was not authorized
to work in the United States. This decision,
which overtly restricted undocumented
migrant workers’ fundamental labor rights
(the right to unionize and the right to back
pay), is commonly believed to have been the
impetus for Mexico’s advisory opinion petition to the Court. Additionally, the U.S.
Supreme Court holding in Hoffman was widely condemned by prominent U.S. and Latin
American labor unions, NGOs, and universities as well as Latin American governments.
According to a 2001 study by the Pew
Hispanic Center, the United States has approximately 5.3 million undocumented workers,
many of whom are from Mexico and other
countries in the region. A number of U.S.
immigration bills passed in the last few decades
have restricted the rights of undocumented
workers, including the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, which instituted
harsher penalties for immigration violations
and severely restricted social benefits for
undocumented immigrants.
While the United States is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court,
Advisory Opinion 18 is nonetheless important
because it lays out a set of governing principles.
Advisory Opinion 18 gives countries that provide a source of undocumented migrant labor,
such as Mexico, a concrete legal basis for criticizing the illegal labor practices of member
states, including those of the United States.
(For an in depth analysis of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, see “A Wink and a Nod: The Hoffman
Case and its Effects on Freedom of Association
for Undocumented Workers,” in the Human
Rights Brief, vol. 10, issue 3.)

MYRNA MACK CHANG V. GUATEMALA
On November 25, 2003, the InterAmerican Court issued a decision against
Guatemala for the 1990 extrajudicial execution of Myrna Mack Chang, a Guatemalan
anthropologist who researched human rights
abuses perpetrated by state security forces
against the Maya Indians during Guatemala’s

36-year civil war. This decision comes after
thirteen years of attempts by Helen Mack,
the victim’s sister, to bring all responsible
state agents to justice.
The Allegations
The victims’ counsel, including attorneys
from the Center for Justice and International
Law (CEJIL), and the law firm of Hogan &
Hartson, L.L.P., alleged that Guatemala violated article 4 (right to life), article 5 (right to personal integrity), article 8 (right to a fair trial),
and article 25 (right to judicial protection) of
the American Convention on Human Rights
(Convention). The Inter-American Commission found a violation of all of the articles
alleged by victims’ counsel except for article 5
(right to personal integrity).
The Court’s Findings
The Court found that Guatemala was
responsible for the planning, execution, and
cover-up of Myrna Mack Chang’s murder. It
held that Guatemala violated Myrna’s right to
life by executing her (article 4). The Court
found that Guatemala violated the personal
integrity of the Mack family by murdering
their family member (article 5). The Court further held that Guatemala violated the family’s
right to a fair trial and right to judicial protection (articles 8 and 25) by failing to effectively
investigate Myrna’s murder and prosecute
those responsible.
The Court ordered Guatemala to fully
and effectively investigate the facts of the
case; identify, judge, and punish all of those
responsible for Myrna’s murder; and remove
all obstacles and mechanisms that maintain
impunity in Guatemala in general. The Court
further ordered Guatemala to publish this
sentence in a national newspaper within three
months; carry out a public act recognizing
responsibility for the murder; publicly honor
the memory of a police investigator who was
murdered by the state for his investigations
and findings in the Mack case; and to provide
human rights training to Guatemalan police,
armed forces, and other security forces. The
Court also ordered Guatemala to establish a
permanent scholarship fund in Myrna’s name
for one year of anthropology study at a major
Guatemalan university; to name a street or
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plaza after her in Guatemala City; and to
place a memorial plaque in the murder location with an explanation of the events leading
to her death.
The court also granted monetary reparations, ordering Guatemala to pay $266,000 in
material damages and $350,000 in non-material damages to Myrna’s family, and $163,000 in
costs and legal fees. The Court gave Guatemala
one year to comply with this ruling.
Analysis
The implications of this case have been farreaching throughout Guatemalan society.
Many important changes have taken place in
Guatemala in the past year, some as a direct
result of this case. In late 2003, the Estado
Mayor Presidencial (EMP), a high-ranking
military unit responsible for planning Myrna’s
murder, was dismantled. This step by the
Guatemalan government resulted, in large
part, from zealous and consistent pressure by
international human rights groups inspired by
the Myrna Mack Chang case.
In January 2004, Colonel Juan Valencia
Osorio, former head of the EMP, was convicted of ordering Myrna Mack Chang’s murder
by the Guatemalan Supreme Court. Osorio
had previously been convicted of this crime
and sentenced to thirty years in prison in
2002, but his conviction was overturned by a
Guatemalan appeals court. The InterAmerican Court decision was instrumental in
leading the Guatemalan Supreme Court to
reconfirm Osorio’s previous conviction and
thirty-year prison sentence.
(For more information on the legal history
and political context of this case, please see
“The Case of Myrna Mack Chang:
Overcoming Institutional Impunity in
Guatemala,” in the Human Rights Brief, vol.
10, issue 3). HRB
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